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Abstract - A credit–method value–added tax, a payroll tax, and 
a business–level wage subsidy can approximate the economic and 
distributional consequences of a subtraction–method X–tax. Such 
a credit–method progressive consumption tax has administrative 
advantages as compared to a subtraction–method progressive 
consumption tax, once certain political factors are taken into 
account. Further, unlike a subtraction–method system, a credit–
method progressive consumption tax could easily interact with 
other tax systems around the world and comply with World Trade 
Organization rules without sacrifi cing best practice VAT design 
features that allow for effective enforcement. 
INTRODUCTION
One of the most basic questions in the perennial debate on fundamental tax reform in the United States is whether 
the federal government should tax income, consumption, or 
both. Advocates of consumption taxes variously hope such 
a move would simplify the tax code, improve economic effi -
ciency, encourage savings and investment, and help solve 
the nation’s long–term fi scal challenges by providing a stable 
source of funding for growing entitlement programs. Some 
proposals would use a consumption tax to replace the income 
tax, while others would reduce income tax rates and raise the 
income threshold for income tax liability. 
Numerous progressive consumption tax proposals have 
received attention in academic and political circles. Among 
the most well–known proposals are the Flat Tax, popularized 
by presidential candidate Steve Forbes, and the X–tax, a pro-
gressive rate variation developed by the late David Bradford 
that uses the same structure as the Flat Tax. Most recently, the 
President’s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform (Tax Reform 
Panel) based the consumption tax portion of its “Growth and 
Investment Tax” (GIT) proposal on the X–tax structure.1 
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 1 Also of note are “consumption–type personal income tax” proposals 
(Andrews, 1974; McCaffrey, 2002). This type of proposal has received less 
attention since the failure of the “USA Tax,” a piece of proposed legislation 
based on this model, in 1995. 
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The Flat Tax and the X–tax both modify 
a “subtraction–method” value–added tax 
(VAT) in a manner that makes the distribu-
tion of the burden of a VAT more progres-
sive. Unlike the Flat Tax and the X–tax, 
VATs are almost always implemented 
using a “credit method.” Credit–method 
VATs are a successful mainstay of fi scal 
systems in over 130 countries around the 
world, including every Organisation for 
Economic Co–operation and Develop-
ment (OECD) country besides the United 
States. On average, VATs provide about 
18 percent of total tax revenues in OECD 
countries, making them an important 
source of government revenue.2 
The “subtraction method” and the 
“credit method” are two alternative meth-
ods for calculating VAT liability. While 
the credit method is used ubiquitously, 
Japan is the only developed economy that 
utilizes some subtraction–method features 
to impose a VAT. No progressive subtrac-
tion–method VAT has ever been put into 
practice in any country. 
Many prior papers have analyzed 
progressive subtraction–method con-
sumption tax proposals. Little discus-
sion, however, has focused on whether 
a progressive consumption tax that is 
economically similar to the Flat Tax or 
the X–tax (referred to together in this 
article as a “subtraction–method X–tax”) 
could be implemented using the credit 
method.3 This article suggests that both 
the economic and distributional conse-
quences of these tax systems could be 
approximated using a different tax struc-
ture based on a credit–method system. 
A “credit–method X–tax,” would consist 
of three formally separate components. 
First, the government would impose a 
standard credit–method VAT. Second, it 
would impose a separate wage tax. Third, 
it would provide incentive payments to 
businesses in connection with hiring U.S. 
workers. 
This article argues that a credit–method 
system of this sort has two key advantages 
over the subtraction–method X–tax that 
academic discussion has focused upon 
up to this point. First, the ability to adopt 
best practices from credit–method systems 
in use around the world provides the 
credit method with substantial practi-
cal advantages. It would be politically 
diffi cult to adapt certain best practices 
associated with credit–method VATs to 
a subtraction–method system. Second, a 
credit–method X–tax would easily interact 
with other tax systems around the world, 
whereas a subtraction–method X–tax 
would not. A subtraction–method X–tax 
cannot be implemented on a “destina-
tion basis” with respect to cross–border 
transactions and remain in compliance 
with World Trade Organization (WTO) 
rules. Being judged WTO non–compliant 
would allow trading partners to impose 
countervailing sanctions against U.S. 
exports and companies. Such sanctions 
could be of a magnitude suffi cient to make 
the system impossible to implement with-
out renegotiating the framework for the 
world’s international trade regime. On the 
other hand, an X–tax that is implemented 
on an “origin basis,” the alternative to a 
destination basis, may be diffi cult or even 
impossible to enforce. Thus, a progressive 
credit–method consumption tax utilizing 
a business–level wage subsidy would be 
administrable and enforceable, whereas a 
subtraction–method X–tax may not be. 
The article fi rst describes the features of 
a VAT, a Flat Tax, and the X–tax as devel-
oped by David Bradford, and highlights 
the similarities and differences between 
implementing a consumption tax using 
 2  See Owens (2006) for a detailed discussion of revenue sources in OECD countries.
 3 Weisbach (2003) considers a progressive credit–method structure before concluding that with the same 
information collection, at a conceptual level the subtraction method and the credit method are equivalent. See 
footnote 15 and accompanying text for further discussion.
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the credit method or the subtraction 
method. The article then focuses on 
certain potential administrative advan-
tages of a credit–method VAT relative to 
a subtraction–method VAT. Third, the 
article explains the WTO rules regarding 
cross–border taxation, illustrates why a 
destination–basis, subtraction–method 
X–tax would not withstand WTO scrutiny, 
and describes administration and enforce-
ment problems that would arise were the 
subtraction–method X–tax to be imposed 
on an origin basis instead, in order to 
comply with WTO rules. The article then 
shows how a VAT, a payroll tax, and a 
business–level wage subsidy could be 
combined to approximate the economic 
and distributional consequences of a 
subtraction–method X–tax. This “credit–
method X–tax” is formally WTO–compli-
ant if imposed on a destination–basis and 
thereby should avoid the administration 
and enforcement problems that would 
arise in an origin–basis X–tax. Finally, the 
article notes that distributional programs 
other than a business–level wage subsidy, 
such as cash payments to individuals, a 
payroll tax rebate, or other demogrants 
could be used to achieve distributional 
results that are similar to the credit–method 
X–tax. I conclude that even if policymak-
ers were to desire the economic and 
distributional result entailed by variants 
of a subtraction–method X–tax, it would 
be best to accomplish those goals with a 
credit–method VAT, along with other tax 
and spending tools, rather than by imple-
menting a subtraction–method X–tax.
INTRODUCTION TO 
CONSUMPTION TAXES
A variety of tax structures can be used 
to tax the value of goods and services 
consumed by taxpayers. In the United 
States, the most familiar consumption tax 
is the retail sales tax (RST) used by most 
of the states. A conceptually pure RST 
would be imposed whenever a house-
hold purchased any good or service for 
the purpose of consumption. However, 
real–world RSTs often are imposed on 
a relatively narrow group of goods and 
services and are prone to evasion.4 RSTs 
also tend to “cascade,” which is to say that 
some goods are double–taxed because 
businesses pay RST on goods or services 
they purchase as inputs for their business 
processes, and then those inputs are taxed 
a second time as part of the sale of the fi nal 
good or service. 
The VAT is an RST that is collected in 
smaller increments throughout the pro-
duction process. Relative to an RST, the 
VAT reduces evasion, improves enforce-
ment, is easier to impose on a broader base 
of goods and services, and systematically 
avoids the “cascading” problem.5 
The Flat Tax and the X–tax are con-
sumption taxes that collect the portion of 
the value added to a product attributable 
to labor at the individual level using a 
graduated rate structure. These graduated 
rates tax consumption progressively. Both 
the Flat Tax and the X–tax are intellectual 
cousins of the VAT, because they modify 
a VAT structure by using the subtrac-
tion–method and graduated rates for the 
portion of the value–added attributable 
to labor. 
Credit–Method VAT
In a credit–method VAT, registered 
businesses assess tax on the goods and 
services they sell each time they make a 
sale to either a business or a consumer. 
Registered businesses are then permitted 
 4 Keen and Smith (2006) review what is known about VAT evasion and fraud in a companion piece to this forum 
article.
 5 Mikesell (2005) and McLure (1998) offer discussions of the narrowness of RST bases and their susceptibility 
to evasion.
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to reduce the amount of VAT they must 
remit to the government by a credit equal 
to the amount of VAT paid to other regis-
tered businesses in purchasing business 
inputs (goods, services, plant and equip-
ment, etc.). The credit eliminates the tax 
on goods and services used by a business, 
but leaves in place the tax on sales to fi nal 
consumers. This mechanism ensures that 
the consumption of all goods and services 
subject to the VAT will be taxed once, but 
only once, at the consumer level. 
The amount of VAT credit available to 
a business to offset VAT liability is gener-
ally determined based on printed invoices 
received by a purchasing business from a 
selling business. These invoices detail the 
amount of VAT collected on a given sale. A 
VAT–paying business subtracts the amount 
of VAT paid, as represented on invoices, 
from the amount of VAT that otherwise 
would be due on its sales. In a well–func-
tioning VAT, a loss–making business with 
more input credits than VAT liability can 
obtain a refund for excess VAT paid. After 
applying input credits, a business’s fi nal 
VAT liability is equivalent to a tax on the 
“value added” by that business; that is, the 
sales price of its outputs less the purchase 
price of its non–labor inputs.
Example 1 (Table 1) illustrates how the 
VAT collects the same amount of tax as an 
ideal retail sales tax. A small brewer buys 
barley and hops from a farmer and uses 
them to produce kegs of beer for sale to 
retailers. The brewer buys barley and hops 
from the farmer at a cost of $30 per keg 
before tax. The brewer sells each keg for 
$70 before tax. The retailer sells a keg for 
$100 before tax. In an ideal RST, only the 
sale by the retailer to consumers would 
be taxed. If the RST rate were 30 percent, 
$30 of tax would be due on the sale of a 
$100 keg. 
A 30 percent VAT added to each transac-
tion in the brewing and distribution pro-
cess collects the same amount of revenue as 
a non–cascading RST (charged only to fi nal 
consumers). Because the VAT is charged on 
all sales of goods and services, the farmer 
collects 30 percent VAT on her sales of 
barley and hops, charging the brewer $9 
of tax on each $30 of sales. The farmer 
remits the $9 of VAT to the government. 
Similarly, the brewer charges the retailer 
$91 ($70 + $21 of VAT) per keg. However, 
instead of sending all $21 of VAT to the 
government, the brewer subtracts the $9 
of VAT paid by the brewer to the farmer 
from the $21 collected in VAT, and remits 
$12 to the government per keg sold. Simi-
larly, instead of sending $30 per keg sold 
to the government, the retailer subtracts 
the $21 of VAT paid by the retailer to the 
brewer from the $30 collected in VAT, and 
remits $9 to the government per keg sold. 
The tax authority receives $30 in total—$9 
from the farmer, $12 from the brewer, and 
TABLE 1
EXAMPLE 1: VAT
Economic Activity
Basic transactions
1. Sales
2. Purchases
3. Labor
4. Value added (sales – purchases)
Credit–Method VAT
5. Tax on sales (30% of line 1)
6. Less: input tax on purchases
7. Net VAT liability
Subtraction–Method VAT
8. VAT liability
     (30% of line 4)
Farmer
$ 30
 $ 0
$ 20
$ 30
 $ 9
 $ 0
 $ 9
 $ 9
Brewer
$ 70
$ 30
$ 20
$ 40
$ 21
 $ 9
$ 12
$ 12
Retailer
$ 100
 $ 70
 $ 26
 $ 30 
 $ 30
 $ 21
  $ 9
  $ 9
Total
 
 
$ 100
 
 
 $ 30
 $ 30
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$9 from the retailer. The VAT and the RST 
collect equivalent amounts of revenue, and 
from the consumer’s perspective the taxes 
look identical. 
Credit–method VAT liability is gener-
ally calculated from accounts for a taxable 
period (generally monthly, bi–monthly, 
or quarterly). Aggregate input tax paid 
is subtracted from aggregate tax liabil-
ity on all taxable sales for the taxable 
period. Notwithstanding the fact that 
the credit–method VAT is often referred 
to as a “transaction–based” tax (because 
conceptually the tax is assessed on each 
individual transaction subject to the VAT), 
VAT liability and VAT credits are not 
matched for each individual item sold.
Subtraction–Method VAT
The most important formal difference 
between the subtraction–method VAT and 
the credit–method VAT is that the former 
does not use credits.6 Tax paid is not sub-
tracted from tax liability, as in the credit 
method. Instead, businesses subtract the 
total value of their purchases from other 
businesses subject to VAT from the total 
value of their sales and then multiply by 
the VAT rate to determine their tax liabil-
ity. Thus, the subtraction method is some-
times described as being “account–based” 
rather than “transaction–based.”7
Another difference between subtrac-
tion–method and credit–method VATs is 
that the former may not use invoices to 
verify whether a taxpayer actually paid 
VAT on the purchases from other busi-
nesses that the taxpayer claims as deduc-
tions. Regardless of whether invoices are 
used, however, technically sophisticated 
subtraction–method VAT proposals 
should not allow taxpayers to deduct the 
cost of purchases from businesses that 
do not collect VAT—at least in the case of 
purchases made from domestic businesses 
(Hufbauer and Grieco, 2005; Tax Reform 
Panel, 2005).
Setting aside any administration and 
enforcement considerations, and assum-
ing that all purchases are made from other 
VAT–paying businesses, the distinctions 
described above make no difference in 
terms of revenue collected. Exactly the 
same amount of tax should be levied at 
each stage in the production process and 
paid by each fi rm under the subtraction–
method VAT as under the credit–method 
VAT. The amounts collected under the two 
taxes are identical because the tax value of 
subtracting purchased inputs from the tax 
base is arithmetically identical to a credit 
for all previous VAT paid at the same tax 
rate on those inputs.
The Japanese Hybrid VAT
While the credit–method VAT is used 
all around the world, no major developed 
economy imposes a subtraction–method 
VAT. The Japanese VAT is sometimes 
described as a subtraction–method tax 
in the U.S. tax literature, but is more of 
a hybrid of the subtraction and credit 
methods.8 The Japanese VAT resembles a 
prototypical subtraction–method VAT in 
the sense that Japanese VAT taxpayers are 
allowed to derive the amount of credit for 
VAT paid to which they are entitled based 
on total purchases from domestic entities, 
instead of adding up amounts shown on 
credit–method invoices. Furthermore, the 
Japanese VAT uses an annual accounting 
period.9 Accounting periods are signifi -
 6 The subtraction–method VAT is also sometimes called a “business transfer tax.”
 7 For a discussion of the distinction between “account–based” and “transaction–based” taxes in the context of 
border adjustability, see Summers (1996).
 8 See Schenk (1995), Thuronyi (2003) and Japanese Ministry of Finance (2005) for information on how the 
Japanese VAT is run.
 9 Certain businesses may elect to pay VAT quarterly, including exporters eligible for refunds.
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cantly shorter in credit–method VATs used 
in the OECD. 
As in credit–method VATs, the Japa-
nese allow their VAT taxpayers to deduct 
consumption tax paid over a taxable 
period from consumption tax due. In this 
respect, the Japanese use the credit 
method. The Japanese VAT also includes 
special rules for mid–sized businesses 
that allow them to pay presumptive 
VAT liability rather than VAT calculated 
based on actual sales and input tax paid. 
As a result, the Japanese VAT allows 
subtraction–method VAT deductions 
(the equivalent of credit–method input 
credits) for some presumptive purchases 
that may not have been made or on 
which VAT may not have been assessed.10 
In this regard, the “real world” Japa-
nese VAT does not comport with the 
theoretical requirement that would limit 
taxpayers in a hypothetical subtrac-
tion–method VAT to deducting the cost 
of purchases from businesses that them-
selves collect VAT.
Single–Rate Flat Tax 
The “Flat Tax” is based on a subtrac-
tion–method VAT, but adds workers to the 
collection process. Robert Hall and Alvin 
Rabushka, two Stanford economists, fi rst 
proposed the Flat Tax (Hall and Rabushka, 
1995).11 Like a subtraction–method VAT, 
the starting point for calculating a busi-
ness’ Flat Tax liability is the difference 
between the value of sales of goods 
and services and the value of purchases 
(including goods, services, plant, and 
equipment) from other businesses subject 
to the Flat Tax. However, in contrast to 
a VAT, businesses are also permitted to 
subtract amounts paid to employees as 
compensation.12 
The Flat Tax then imposes an employee–
level tax on wages. Amounts removed 
from the business Flat Tax base via the 
wage deduction are thereby added back 
to the overall tax base by taxing employ-
ees. In this way, tax on the portion of a 
business’ value–added attributable to 
labor is collected from workers instead of 
businesses. In the case of a Flat Tax 
with identical rates at the business and 
employee level, and no zero–bracket 
amount, the total amount of revenue col-
lected would be equivalent to the revenue 
collected by a VAT imposed at the same 
rate. The most important conceptual dif-
ference between the VAT and the Flat Tax 
is, therefore, the point of collection of the 
tax. Unlike a VAT, the Flat Tax requires 
both businesses and individuals to fi le 
and pay taxes.13 
The Flat Tax as proposed by Hall and 
Rabushka includes a zero–bracket amount 
below which taxpayers pay no tax on their 
wages. In this sense, the Flat Tax is not 
“fl at” at all—rather there are two rates: 
zero and another positive rate. The zero 
bracket makes the Flat Tax progressive, 
unlike a standard VAT. 
10 Businesses with annual taxable sales of less than ¥ 50 million can choose to calculate their VAT input credits by 
multiplying tax liability on sales by a fi xed percentage determined based on a statutorily prescribed business 
classifi cation system (Japanese Ministry of Finance, 2005).
11 Former presidential candidate Steve Forbes and former House Majority Leader Dick Armey fi rst popularized 
the proposal.
12 To prevent leakage from the consumption tax base, the Flat Tax should limit the business–level deduction for 
compensation to compensation that is subject to U.S. tax at the individual level. Hall and Rabushka (1995) do 
not, however, address this issue in their writings about the Flat Tax.
13 The Flat Tax also differs from a VAT in that it would provide a carryforward for losses. The carryforward 
would grow at a market rate of interest (Hall, 2005). In contrast, losses are refunded under most credit–method 
VATs (Ebrill, Keen, Bodin, and Summers, 2001). The policy of carrying losses forward rather than refunding 
them is in part a consequence of the fact that many more businesses would have input credits that exceed 
their Flat Tax liability than is the case in a VAT, because under a VAT there is no input credit (deduction) for 
wages paid.
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Subtraction–Method X–tax
The X–tax as conceived by David Brad-
ford increases the progressivity of a Flat 
Tax–like structure (see, for example, Brad-
ford (1996, 2005)). Like the Flat Tax, the 
X–tax would use the subtraction method 
and impose tax at a single rate on business 
cash fl ow, defi ned as sales minus the cost 
of materials, labor, and purchases of busi-
ness assets. The X–tax modifi es the Flat 
Tax by employing multiple tax brackets 
(above the zero bracket) for labor earn-
ings. For example, an X–tax could have a 
15 percent bracket below some threshold 
and a 30 percent rate above it.14 
Returning to our earlier example, 
imagine that the farmer grows barley and 
hops using lower–earning labor (subject 
to tax on wages in a lower tax bracket). 
The brewer uses a mix of lower–earn-
ing labor and higher–earning labor to 
make beer, and the retailer uses a mix of 
lower–earning and higher–earning labor 
to sell kegs to consumers. Lines 5 through 
8 of Example 2 (Table 2) show the now–
familiar treatment of these transactions 
under a subtraction–method VAT and a 
credit–method VAT assessed at a rate of 30 
percent. Lines 9 through 12 demonstrate 
how the same transactions would be taxed 
under a subtraction–method X–tax.
Example 2 shows that businesses remit 
less tax to the government under an X–tax 
than they do under a VAT (compare 
line 9 to line 8), because a portion of the 
value added is taxed at the individual 
level. The difference in total collections 
under the X–tax is due to the fact that 
the labor component of value associated 
with lower–earning workers is taxed at a 
reduced rate of 15 percent. Line 3a shows 
TABLE 2
EXAMPLE 2: SUBTRACTION–METHOD VAT, CREDIT–METHOD VAT, 
AND SUBTRACTION–METHOD X–TAX
Economic Activity
Basic transactions
1. Sales
2. Purchases
3a. Lower–bracket labor
3b. Higher–bracket labor
4. Value added (sales – purchases)
Subtraction–Method VAT
5. VAT liability
     (30% of line 4)
Credit–Method VAT
6. Tax on sales (30% of line 1)
7. Less:  input tax on purchases
8. Net VAT liability
Subtraction–Method X–tax
9. Tax paid at business level 
     (0.3 × (line 4 – line 3a – line 3b))
10. Tax paid at individual level—
      lower bracket (15% of line 3a)
11. Tax paid at individual level—
      higher bracket (30% of line 3b)
12. Total subtraction–method X–tax collections
Farmer
$ 30
 $ 0
$ 20
 $ 0
$ 30
 $ 9
 $ 9
 $ 0
 $ 9
 $ 3
 $ 3
 $ 0
 $ 6
Brewer
$ 70
$ 30
$ 10
$ 10
$ 40
$ 12
$ 21
 $ 9
$ 12
 $ 6
      $ 1.50
 $ 3
     $ 10.50
Retailer
$ 100
 $ 70
 $ 20
  $ 6
 $ 30 
  $ 9
 $ 30
 $ 21
  $ 9
       $ 1.20
  $ 3
       $ 1.80
  $ 6
Total
 
 
 
$ 100
 $ 30
 
 
 $ 30
   $ 10.20
    $ 7.50
    $ 4.80
   $ 22.50
14 The Tax Reform Panel’s pure X–tax proposal, the “Progressive Consumption Tax,” utilized three tax rates on 
labor compensation ranging from 15 percent to 35 percent, as well as a zero–bracket amount (Tax Reform 
Panel, 2005). Robert Hall explained to the Tax Reform Panel that he now advocates an X–tax rather than a Flat 
Tax because the “consumption gap” between more prosperous and less prosperous Americans has widened 
in the 25 years since he fi rst proposed the Flat Tax (see Hall (2005)).
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that $50 of the $100 of value associated 
with the keg is generated by lower–earn-
ing labor. That $50 of value is taxed at the 
business level under the VAT, producing 
$15 of revenue for the government at a 30 
percent rate. In contrast, the X–tax taxes 
that value–added at a 15 percent rate, rais-
ing only $7.50. This difference accounts for 
the $7.50 reduction in collections under 
the X–tax as compared to the VAT. The 15 
percent rate on the wages of lower–earn-
ing labor makes the X–tax more progres-
sive than its Flat Tax cousin. 
CREDIT–METHOD AND 
SUBTRACTION–METHOD 
CONSUMPTION TAXES IN 
THE REAL WORLD
In this article, I argue that replacing 
the income tax with a consumption tax 
based on a credit–method VAT and other 
progressive offsets would likely result in 
a more administrable and economically 
effi cient system than if a progressive con-
sumption tax were implemented using the 
subtraction method. 
David Weisbach (2003) elegantly dem-
onstrates that purported substantive dif-
ferences between the subtraction method 
and the credit method are not inherent 
to the two methods of calculation. Any 
differences, such as the ability to deduct 
the cost of inputs purchased from non–
taxpayers or the flexibility to impose 
preferential tax rates on specifi c goods 
or services, are based on the amount of 
information that analysts assume will be 
collected in credit–method and subtrac-
tion–method systems, respectively. With 
the same information collection and par-
allel design decisions, the two methods 
can, in principle, be made to produce 
identical results on any relevant policy 
dimension.15 
More practically, however, using the 
credit method makes it more likely that 
worldwide credit–method norms will 
be adopted, while using the subtrac-
tion method makes it more likely that 
the information that is collected will be 
similar to the sort of information that 
is collected under our present subtrac-
tion–method corporate income tax or the 
subtraction–method Japanese system. 
In any consumption tax, business–level 
deductions or credits are appropriate 
only for inputs on which consumption 
tax was paid by the seller. To the extent 
insufficient information is collected to 
enforce this rule, signifi cant tax planning 
opportunities arise to enter into transac-
tions where a deduction of an input cost 
by one party is not offset by an inclusion 
by the other.16
Some claim that a subtraction–method 
system is more likely to survive the 
political process than a credit–method 
system because it can be described as a 
gradual reform of the current system. At 
fi rst glance, the only differences between 
a subtraction–method consumption tax 
and a corporate income tax are expensing 
and the loss of interest deductions. These 
are major changes, but in political circles 
these changes may seem minor relative 
to the perceived sea–change of repealing 
the corporate income tax and replacing it 
with a credit–method VAT assessed at the 
cash register. 
Those who claim that a subtraction–
method system would be easier to pass 
politically than a credit method system 
because of its relative familiarity17 should 
recognize that maintaining that famil-
iarity creates pressures to retain design 
15 Sophisticated proponents of subtraction–method cash fl ow taxes generally support adoption of credit–invoice 
type rules in adopting the subtraction method (see, for example, Weisbach (2003) and Hufbauer and Greico 
(2005)). 
16 See Weisbach (2000) for a discussion of these problems.
17 The Tax Reform Panel, for example, suggested that its X–tax “would be implemented using the subtraction 
method because it is closer to current law methods of accounting.” (Tax Reform Panel, 2005, p. 163).
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features that resemble those contained in 
the present corporate income tax. These 
design features, in turn, form part of the 
basis for other analysts’ claims regard-
ing the superiority of the credit method 
over the subtraction method.18 One major 
concern is that a subtraction–method 
system would be vulnerable to a political 
compromise that allowed capital invest-
ments to be expensed without eliminating 
deductions for interest expense.19 Such a 
system would provide an economically 
distortive tax subsidy to new investment.
The treatment of small businesses and the 
treatment of losses provide two further 
examples of how advocating a subtrac-
tion–method system because of its relative 
familiarity is likely to result in suboptimal 
design decisions. 
Small Business
A small business exemption is included 
as part of most credit–method VATs. A 
credit–method VAT can exempt many 
small businesses from collecting the tax 
at relatively low cost, because the VAT is 
collected at every stage of production and 
many businesses buy many of their inputs 
from larger businesses. Exempted busi-
nesses tend to account for a relatively small 
fraction of gross receipts and continue to 
pay VAT on their inputs, limiting revenue 
loss, while some businesses eligible for 
exemption voluntarily choose to collect 
VAT in order to pass input tax credits on 
to their customers. Thus, a VAT exemption, 
if implemented with a reasonably high 
threshold, is administratively appealing.20 
It simplifi es enforcement efforts by sub-
stantially decreasing the number of VAT 
returns the IRS would receive.21 As the 
compliance costs associated with a VAT are 
low overall, but may be disproportionately 
high for many small businesses, a small 
business exemption also minimizes the 
impact that the administrative costs of the 
VAT may have on business.
A credit–method tax would likely be 
perceived as a tax on individual transac-
tions, like a sales tax. The small business 
exemption would simply be a feature of 
the new tax system. However, Congress 
may be less prepared politically to exempt 
small–business owners from taxation in 
a subtraction–method system. It may be 
politically diffi cult to exempt from tax 
an “accounts–based” amount that would 
remain, in most people’s eyes, akin to the 
profi ts of a small business.22 
18 For example, McClure’s (2005) suggestion that the subtraction method is more politically vulnerable to demands 
for exemptions is based on the premise that in a subtraction–method system deductions would be available 
for purchases from non–taxpayers, as they are in the present corporate income tax.
19 Pearlman (2005) provides an example of this concern. See also Tax Reform Panel (2005).
20 Preliminary estimates for 2003 suggest that only 1.8 percent of gross receipts in the United States are collected 
by businesses with less than $100,000 in gross receipts. A gross receipts exemption threshold of approximately 
$100,000 would entail relatively little revenue loss for the fi sc according to a 1993 Governmental Accountability 
Offi ce study (U.S. GAO, 1993). The GAO estimated that in 1993 a U.S. VAT collection threshold of $100,000 
would have reduced the number of businesses fi ling VAT returns in the United States from 24 million to about 
9 million. 
21 Providing a small business exemption does create the potential for fi rms to avoid VAT by organizing their 
activities in a series of small enterprises. Anti–abuse rules that aggregate related fi rms for purposes of applying 
the VAT threshold would, therefore, be necessary. Some commentators suggest that these rules can be quite 
burdensome (Bankman and Schler, 2005). However, the present income tax utilizes many rules that turn on 
direct, indirect, or constructive control of one enterprise by another. As a whole, the simplifi cation and enforce-
ment benefi ts of a VAT threshold for small business exemption seem to substantially outweigh the burden 
of enforcing a deconsolidation anti–abuse rule associated with the VAT threshold. Thus, to the extent that a 
small–business threshold would be incorporated into a credit–method system but not a subtraction–method 
system, the small business exemption factor weighs in favor of a credit–method consumption tax system.
22 This sentiment exists even in some countries with credit–method systems. Italy and Spain do not provide 
for small business exemptions in their VATs, although they do allow for presumptive taxation based on fi rm 
characteristics and substantially reduced reporting requirements (Ebrill, Keen, Bodin, and Summers, 2001).
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Losses
Similar perception problems may 
impact the treatment of losses in a subtrac-
tion–method system. All credit–method 
systems provide near–immediate full 
refunds for losses.23 Tax systems that do 
not provide full and immediate refunds 
for losses impose a higher effective tax 
rate on higher–risk and startup ventures 
than on other businesses. Fully refunding 
losses ensures that the tax system does 
not disproportionately discourage risky 
ventures. However, for cosmetic reasons 
of the same variety that affect the small 
business exception, business–level losses 
are unlikely to be fully refundable in a 
subtraction–method X–tax. The corpo-
rate income tax system allows losses to 
be carried back and carried forward, to 
claim refunds for prior years or reduce tax 
liability in future years.24 Thus, it is likely 
to be diffi cult to explain immediate full 
refunds for business losses in a tax that 
is marketed as a gradual reform. In fact, 
neither the Flat Tax nor the GIT proposed 
by the Tax Reform Panel included a provi-
sion for fully and immediately refundable 
losses. Instead, each of those proposals 
would have businesses carry losses for-
ward with interest. 
Small business and loss refunds are 
only two examples of areas where the 
consequences of marketing a consump-
tion tax as a reform of the current system 
rather than as an entirely new tax system 
will affect the viability and effective-
ness of the result. Gradual transition to 
a subtraction–method consumption tax 
from a corporate income tax would also 
be more complicated than the adoption 
of a credit–method VAT. The more dra-
matic perceived differences between a 
credit–method system and the corporate 
income tax make a credit–method system 
easier to adopt “cold turkey.”25 
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 
RULES AND THE BORDER TAX 
ADJUSTMENT ISSUE 
What Is a Border Tax Adjustment?
Consumption taxes can be imposed on 
either a “destination basis” or an “ori-
gin basis.”26 A “destination–basis” tax 
excludes exports from the tax base and 
includes imports in the tax base. Thus, 
domestic consumption is taxed regardless 
of where the goods being consumed are 
produced.27 An origin–basis tax includes 
exports in the tax base and excludes 
imports from the tax base. The tax base 
in an origin–basis system is equal to the 
value of goods and services produced in 
the taxing jurisdiction, regardless of where 
those goods and services are consumed. 
Thus, an origin–basis tax is imposed on 
the entire value of goods and services 
produced domestically (whether sold 
at home or abroad), but taxes only the 
U.S. markup (value added in the United 
23 If fi rms have losses, the subtraction–method X–tax and the credit–method X–tax often will not produce the 
same results, nor would either tax produce the same result as a stand–alone credit–method VAT. Space does 
not permit me to fully address these issues here.
24 Net operating losses can generally be carried back for two years or carried forward for 20 years. Many limita-
tions and special rules apply, including rules limiting or disallowing the carryover of net operating losses when 
stock ownership in a corporation shifts in specifi ed ways (See § 172 and §§ 381 through 384 of the Internal 
Revenue Code).
25 Demands for transition relief may also be more intense in a subtraction–method X–tax than they would be 
under a credit–method system (Graetz, 1997). As a political matter, it is likely to be easier to deny relief if the 
perception is that the corporate income tax has been eliminated and replaced with an entirely new tax system. 
For a discussion of the political dynamics of consumption tax reform, see Shaviro (2006).
26 See Grubert and Newlon (1995) for an excellent discussion of international implications of consumption 
taxes.
27 Symmetrically, foreign consumption is not taxed, regardless of whether the goods are produced domesti-
cally.
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States) to the value of imported goods 
and services.28 
Imposing the VAT, the Flat Tax, or 
the X–tax on a destination basis (taxing 
imports and excluding exports from tax) 
requires a border adjustment. To elimi-
nate the tax paid on an exported good 
by businesses at earlier stages in the 
production and distribution process, an 
exporter receives a refund for tax paid on 
its inputs under a credit–method system, 
even though no tax is assessed on export 
sales (because the good or service is not 
being consumed in the United States). 
Similarly, in a subtraction–method system 
the taxpayer is allowed to deduct inputs 
associated with export sales even though 
it does not include export sales in taxable 
cash fl ow for purposes of determining its 
tax liability. Sales for which a business can 
claim input credits or deductions even 
though tax is not assessed on related sales 
are “zero–rated” sales. The tax refund 
associated with zero–rated export sales is 
called a “border adjustment.”
Example 3 (Table 3) illustrates the 
mechanics of a border adjustment using 
a VAT imposed via either the subtraction 
method or the credit method. Example 3 is 
identical to Example 1, except that the keg 
produced by the brewer is purchased by 
an exporter and sold abroad. As a result, 
a border adjustment is due with respect to 
the VAT paid on the beer at earlier stages 
of production. As line 5 and line 8 show in 
the last column, once a border adjustment 
is provided to the exporter, net VAT col-
lected by the government is zero.
Border Adjustability of a Subtraction–
Method X–tax
In principle, a subtraction–method 
X–tax can be border–adjusted in the 
same way as a subtraction–method VAT. 
Inputs associated with export sales can 
be deducted even though export sales 
revenue is not included. 
However, under current WTO rules as 
originally developed under The General 
28 Not surprisingly, many U.S. companies oppose this treatment of exports and imports. Because the tax does 
not tax the full value of imported goods and services that are consumed domestically, it appears to favor 
imports. Economic theory suggests the benefi t to imports from origin–basis treatment will be offset by cur-
rency exchange rates or other changes in the price level. See Viard (2004) for a discussion of the economics 
of border adjustments. The possibility that adjustments would occur other than through exchange rates and 
over an extended transition period was a source of concern for the Tax Reform Panel (Tax Reform Panel, 2005, 
p. 173). 
TABLE 3
EXAMPLE 3: BORDER ADJUSTED VATS
Economic Activity
Basic transactions
1. Sales
2. Purchases
3a. Lower–bracket labor
3b. Higher–bracket labor
4. Value added (sales – purchases)
Subtraction–Method VAT
5. Subtraction–method VAT
     (30% of line 4)
Credit–Method VAT
6. Tax on sales (30% of line 1)
7. Less: input tax on purchases
8. Net VAT liability
Farmer
$ 30
 $ 0
 $ 20
 $ 0
$ 30 
 $ 9
 $ 9
 $ 0
 $ 9
Brewer
$ 70
$ 30
$ 10
$ 10
$ 40
$ 12
$ 21
 $ 9
$ 12
Beer Exporter
$ 100 (zero–rated)
$ 70
$ 20
$ 6
–$ 70 
–$ 21*
$ 0 (zero–rated)
$ 21*
–$ 21
Total
 
 
 
$ 100
  $ 0
 
 
  $ 0
*Border adjustment.
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Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 
a border tax adjustment must meet two 
criteria to avoid being deemed a prohib-
ited trade subsidy. First, the tax must not 
be a “direct” tax. The WTO’s Agreement 
on Subsidies and Countervailing Mea-
sures (ASCM) prohibits member states 
from taxing imports and rebating tax paid 
on exports for “direct” taxes. In contrast, 
WTO rules allow countries to border–
adjust “indirect taxes.” A subtraction–
method X–tax would almost certainly be 
treated as a direct tax under GATT rules. 
Second, the rebate on the export of a good 
or service must not exceed the amount 
levied on the same good or service when 
sold for domestic consumption. Measur-
ing the amount levied on the same good or 
service when sold for domestic consump-
tion under an X–tax is likely to be complex 
and controversial.
“Direct” vs. “Indirect” Tax
The ASCM treats exempting or remitting 
“direct” taxes on exports as a prohibited 
export subsidy, thereby prohibiting border 
adjustments of such taxes.29 The ASCM 
defi nes direct taxes as “taxes on wages, 
profi ts . . . and all other forms of income.” 
(ASCM, 1994, Annex VII[58]). In con-
trast, indirect taxes are defi ned as “sales, 
excise, turnover, value added . . . and all 
taxes other than direct taxes and import 
charges.” (ASCM, 1994, Annex VII[58]).
Some observers claim that the GATT’s 
distinction between direct and indirect 
taxes arose at the urging of the United 
States during negotiations leading to 
the initial adoption of the GATT in 1947. 
According to this account, U.S. negotia-
tors sought a border adjustment rule that 
paralleled U.S. sales and corporate income 
tax rules for interstate transactions (Gib-
bons, 2002). States do not assess sales tax 
on sales made by companies inside their 
borders to customers outside the state, but 
income from these sales is taxable under 
state corporate income taxes.30
Others claim that the distinction in the 
ASCM between direct and indirect taxes 
arose due to a (faulty) assumption that 
the burden of indirect taxes was shifted 
onto the consumer, whereas direct taxes 
were borne by the legal payor.31 Since 
indirect taxes were thought to be imposed 
on the ultimate consumer rather than on 
the producer, reimbursing such a tax was 
not viewed as an export subsidy; any 
consumption tax revenues would appro-
priately be collected by the government of 
the nation in which the consumer resides. 
In contrast, the corporate income tax 
was thought to reduce corporate profi ts, 
so that rebating that tax would transfer 
money from the nation of consumption 
29 An illustrative list of export subsidies in Annex I of the ASCM includes “… special deductions directly re-
lated to exports or export performance, over and above those granted in respect to production for domestic 
consumption, in the calculation of the base on which direct taxes are charged.” (ASCM, 1994, Annex I(f)). 
30 The GATT’s distinction between direct and indirect taxes conforms to the defi nition of those terms used in 
U.S. domestic jurisprudence, further suggesting that the United States may have proposed the direct/indirect 
tax distinction in the GATT. In U.S. domestic law, an indirect tax is understood to be a tax that is imposed on 
goods, rather than income or wealth. (See Zenith Radio Corp v. United States (1978), United States v. State of West 
Virginia (2003)). This understanding in fact predates the Founding. (“[T]axes may be subdivided into those 
of the direct kind and those of the indirect kind… [A]s to the latter, by which must be understood duties and 
excises on articles of consumption, one is at a loss to conceive what can be the nature of the diffi culties com-
prehended” (The Federalist No. 36, Alexander Hamilton, available in Hamilton, Madison, Jay, 1961, p. 219).) 
31 The modern understanding is that the incidence of a unit tax on consumption depends on the elasticities of 
supply and demand. (See, e.g., Rosen (2004)). Research suggests that consumption taxes are borne primarily 
by consumers, wage taxes imposed at the individual level are borne by wage earners, wage taxes imposed 
at the business level (such as the employer portion of social security and Medicare taxes) are borne either 
by workers or by consumers generally, and corporate income taxes are borne in part by labor and in part by 
capital (Atkinson, 2004); the incidence of taxes on capital income is controversial within the economic profes-
sion (Fuchs, Krueger, and Poterba, 1998).
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to the nation of production (Graetz, 1997). 
The 1970 GATT Working Party on Border 
Adjustments stated that “direct taxes—
even assuming that they were passed on 
into prices—were borne by entrepreneurs’ 
profits” (GATT, 1970). In contrast, the 
1970 Report suggested that the VAT was 
directly levied on products and therefore 
was borne by the consumer.32 
Unlike a credit–method VAT, a subtrac-
tion–method X–tax does not appear to be a 
tax imposed on sales to consumers. Rather, 
because it is formally accounts–based and 
utilizes deductions rather than credits, the 
subtraction–method X–tax resembles a tax 
on corporate income or profi ts. Further, 
the regime includes a tax on wages. As a 
result, a subtraction–method X–tax would 
likely be treated as a direct tax if chal-
lenged at the WTO (Summers, 1996).
Recognizing this problem, the Tax Reform 
Panel chose not to include the revenues that 
border adjustments would have generated 
over the budget window in determining 
whether its GIT proposal was revenue neu-
tral.33 With the $775 billion raised by border 
adjustments under the estimates provided 
to the Panel by the Treasury Department, 
the Panel could have proposed tax rates 
that would have been lower across the 
board by approximately fi ve percent.34 The 
choice not to use the revenues from border 
adjustments thus suggests that the Panel 
believed that a subtraction–method X–tax 
most probably is not border adjustable 
under current WTO rules.35 
Excessive Exemption or 
Remission of Tax
In addition to prohibiting border 
adjustments of direct taxes, the ASCM 
requires that border adjustments for 
indirect taxes not exceed the tax levied 
on similar products sold in the domestic 
market (See ASCM (1994, Annex I(g))).36 
Example 4 (Table 4) compares the treat-
ment of an exporter under a VAT and a 
subtraction–method X–tax. If the beer 
exporter is permitted to deduct both the 
value of purchases and labor associated 
with export sales without taking those 
sales into account in calculating taxable 
cash fl ow, the exporter will be owed a 
refund of $28.80 for each keg sold under 
the X–tax (as shown in line 9). This com-
pares with a rebate of only $21 for the 
exporter under a VAT (as shown in line 
32 The Report concluded that the value–added tax was border–adjustable because “it was agreed [that] regard-
less of its technical construction (fractioned collection), [the VAT] was equivalent in this respect to a tax levied 
directly—a retail or sales tax” (GATT, 1970). 
33 Border adjustments raise revenue when a country is a net importer because more money is collected on 
imports than must be refunded with respect to exports. The U.S. is a large net importer, and will be so for the 
foreseeable future. Economists, however, point out that trade defi cits cannot last forever—eventually the U.S. 
must pay for its consumption of foreign goods or services with U.S. goods or services. Another implication of 
this basic identity of economics is that border adjustments will not raise revenue in net present value terms 
over an infi nite time horizon (if one assumes VAT rates remain constant.) In fact, on a net present value basis 
over an infi nite horizon the United States would actually lose revenue by imposing a border adjustment. A 
border adjustment is equivalent to providing a deduction for net foreign investment and levying a tax on 
net foreign–source income. Because the United States is a net debtor to the rest of the world, this adjustment 
should reduce U.S. government revenue from a VAT (Auerbach, 1997).
34 The Tax Reform Panel report noted that had the Panel not needed to pay for an AMT “patch,” it would have 
had to raise $866 billion less in revenue to be “revenue neutral” and, therefore, could have reduced rates across 
the board by 5.6 percent (Tax Reform Panel, 2005, p. 189).
35 The Tax Reform Panel report states that “[g]iven the uncertainty over whether border adjustments would 
be allowable under current trade rules, and the possibility of challenge from our trading partners, the Panel 
chose not to include any revenue that would be raised through border adjustments in making the Growth 
and Investment Tax Plan revenue neutral.” (Tax Reform Panel, 2005, p. 172).
36 GATT/WTO prohibits “exemption or remission in respect of the production and distribution of exported 
products of indirect taxes in excess of those levied in respect of the production and distribution of like products 
when sold for domestic consumption.”
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8), despite the fact that the tax rate is the 
same. As a result, some WTO members 
may be inclined to challenge whether 
the $28.80 border adjustment resulting is 
too high under WTO rules. They would 
argue that the rebate is in excess of the 
amount levied on goods when sold for 
domestic consumption because it is paid 
at the tax rate applicable to business cash 
fl ow, while wages are deducted and taxed 
progressively.37 On the other hand, deter-
mining the tax actually assessed on the 
labor component of value added to each 
individual exported product in order to 
provide precise border adjustments may 
be highly problematic. Thus, a subtrac-
tion–method X–tax may not be able to 
meet the WTO’s standard prohibiting 
“excessive” border adjustments.
ADMINISTRATION AND 
ENFORCEMENT PROBLEMS IN AN 
ORIGIN–BASIS SUBTRACTION–
METHOD X–TAX
Without border adjustments, a subtrac-
tion–method X–tax would be suscep-
tible to unintended revenue–reducing 
cross–border transactions and face related 
problems of administration and enforce-
ment.38 Taxpaying businesses would be 
able to deduct purchases from foreign 
businesses that do not pay U.S. tax. 
Thus, taxpayers could claim deductions 
that would not be offset by correspond-
ing inclusions by other taxpayers. For 
this and related enforcement reasons, 
the Tax Reform Panel rightly expressed 
a preference for a border–adjustable con-
TABLE 4
EXAMPLE 4: SUBTRACTION–METHOD VAT, CREDIT–METHOD VAT, AND SUBTRACTION–METHOD 
X–TAX WITH BORDER ADJUSTMENTS
Economic Activity
Basic transactions
1. Sales
2. Purchases
3a. Lower–bracket labor
3b. Higher–bracket labor
4. Value added (sales – purchases)
Subtraction–Method VAT
5. Subtraction–method VAT
     (30% of line 4)
Credit–Method VAT
6. Tax on sales (30% of line 1)
7. Less: input tax on purchases
8. Net VAT liability
Subtraction–Method X–tax
9. Tax paid at business level
      (0.3 × (line 4 – line 3a – line 3b))
10. Tax paid at individual level—
       lower bracket (15% of line 3a)
11. Tax paid at individual level—
       higher bracket (30% of line 3b)
12. Total subtraction–method X–tax
Farmer
$ 30
 $ 0
$ 20
 $ 0
$ 30 
 $ 9
 $ 9
 $ 0
 $ 9
 $ 3
 $ 3
 $ 0
 $ 6
Brewer
$ 70
$ 30
$ 10
$ 10
$ 40
$ 12
$ 21
 $ 9
$ 12
 $ 6
    $ 1.50
 $ 3
   $ 10.50
Beer Exporter
$ 100 (zero–rated)
   $ 70
   $ 20
    $ 6
–$ 70 
      –$ 21*
$ 0 (zero–rated)
      $ 21
      –$ 21*
      –$ 28.80 *
  $ 3
       $ 1.80
–$ 24
Total
 
 
 
$ 100
  $ 0
 
 
  $ 0
     –$ 19.80
       $ 7.50 
       $ 4.80
   – $ 7.50
*Border adjustment.
37 Permitting border adjustments of an X–tax at the rate applicable to business cash fl ow could be defensible. 
Consider what would happen in a VAT if all workers were treated as their own business and assessed VAT on 
the labor they supplied their employers. If each worker was her own VAT–assessing business, a credit–method 
VAT applied to Example 4 would produce a border adjustment of $28.80, just like the subtraction–method 
X–tax.
38 In Weisbach’s terminology, the system would be “open” (what McClure calls “naïve”) with respect to cross–bor-
der transactions (See e.g., Weisbach (2000), Weisbach (2003), McLure (1998)).
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sumption tax (Tax Reform Panel, 2005, 
p. 167).
The most widely discussed problem 
with an origin–basis consumption tax 
is its susceptibility to transfer pricing 
problems.39 Transfer prices are the amount 
charged by related entities in sales and 
transfers to one another. These entities 
have incentives to set prices in their trans-
actions with one another to minimize tax, 
rather than on an “arm’s length” basis. 
Transfer pricing is also a major problem 
in enforcing the present international 
tax regime. Nevertheless, there are some 
reasons to fear that transfer pricing prob-
lems might be even more severe under 
an origin–basis X–tax than under current 
law.40 In contrast, border adjustments limit 
the tax base to domestic consumption. 
The price established in cross–border 
transactions is irrelevant to the amount 
of revenue collected, because purchases 
from abroad do not provide a deduction 
and producing goods or services in the 
United States that are consumed abroad 
does not create taxable cash fl ow (See e.g., 
Tax Reform Panel (2005, p. 169)).41 Thus, 
transfer pricing ceases to be an issue.
Related serious tax avoidance problems 
may also arise in an origin–basis system. 
Bankman and Schler (2005) and Weisbach 
(2000) detail some of the potential prob-
lems in the literature. Simple transactions 
can be used to defer tax indefi nitely, such 
as using any gains on domestic sales to 
buy foreign real assets (such as foreign 
real estate) from a related foreign seller 
(Bradford, 2001). Slightly more compli-
cated intercompany transactions may 
be used to manufacture deductions with 
little economic risk. For example, Weis-
bach suggests that a U.S. business could 
set up a shell corporation in the Cayman 
Islands (Weisbach, 2000). The shell bor-
rows money from the U.S. parent and 
promises to repay a contingent amount 
in the future. The Cayman shell then 
uses the borrowed money to purchase an 
asset from the U.S. business. The business 
agrees to repurchase the asset around the 
same time the loan is due for a contingent 
amount that is similar to the amount that 
is due on the loan. The cash fl ows on the 
transaction wash out, so the U.S. busi-
ness will neither gain nor lose money. 
However, the contingency clauses can be 
structured so as to virtually guarantee the 
purchase price and the amount due on 
the loan will go up substantially. The tax 
result is a small inclusion from the sale 
of the asset initially and a much larger 
deduction when the asset is repurchased.42 
39 Bradford focused heavily on the transfer pricing concern in the course of his writings regarding the interna-
tional aspects of the X–tax (See, e.g., Bradford (2004)). 
40 At least before section 103 of the Tax Increase Prevention and Reconciliation Act of 2005 (2005 Act) became law, 
subpart F base company rules backstopped transfer pricing enforcement when U.S. multinationals attempted 
to shift sales or services income to low–tax jurisdictions. Under the United States’ current regime for taxing 
international income, taxation of foreign–source income of a foreign subsidiary of a U.S. company is generally 
deferred until such time as that income is repatriated to the United States. In contrast, in an origin–basis X–tax, 
obtaining foreign–source treatment for cash fl ow permanently exempts that cash fl ow from U.S. taxation. Thus, 
incentives to manipulate rules deeming in which country a good or service is “produced” and transfer prices 
to minimize the value of “U.S.–produced” sales may be stronger under the X–tax than current incentives to 
manipulate transfer prices and sourcing rules to limit current year U.S. income tax liability. (See, generally, 
Graetz and Oosterhuis (2001)). 
41 A destination–basis system does, however, face what Bradford referred to as the “tourism problem,” whereby 
individuals can reduce their taxes by consuming in low–tax jurisdictions (Bradford, 2004).
42 This tax avoidance transaction could also be accomplished in transactions with domestic taxpayers that are not 
registered business–level taxpayers were it not for the invoice requirement for deductions. The potential abuse 
with individuals as counterparties would exist under either an origin–basis system or a destination–basis system. 
This article assumes that an invoice requirement would be imposed domestically under either an origin–basis 
or a destination–basis subtraction–method X–tax, thereby limiting the potential issue to cross–border transac-
tions. Even without an invoice requirement, as a practical matter the likeliest counterparties for large–scale 
abuses of this sort would generally seem to be foreign businesses rather than domestic individuals.
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A destination–basis system avoids these 
problems because a U.S. business does not 
have a deduction when it buys an asset 
from the foreign seller.
Taxpayers may also find it easier to 
manipulate the distinction between real 
and fi nancial transactions to their advan-
tage in an origin–basis system than in 
a destination–basis system.43 Bankman 
and Schler (2005) provide the example of 
a taxpayer entering into offsetting long 
and short forward contracts for delivery 
of goods. The taxpayer settles the favor-
able side of the straddle for cash, result-
ing in nontaxable gain from a fi nancial 
transaction, and takes delivery on the loss 
transaction, resulting in a deductible loss 
(Bankman and Schler, 2005; Weisbach, 
2000). In a destination–basis system, the 
loss would only be deductible if it was 
offset by taxable gain to the counterparty. 
In an origin–basis system, however, a 
transaction involving a foreign counter-
party that does not pay U.S. tax would still 
result in a deduction for the U.S. taxpayer, 
so that there would be an overall loss to 
the U.S. fi sc. 
Finally, an origin–basis system faces 
transition problems that a destination–
basis system would avoid. In an ori-
gin–basis system, firms would have a 
strong incentive to sell assets with basis 
to foreign non–taxpaying counterparties 
immediately prior to transition and to 
repurchase the assets after the effective 
date of the new tax system.44 Doing so 
could provide “self–help” transition relief. 
The taxpayer’s basis in the asset would 
limit the taxpayer’s tax liability on the sale 
in the year prior to implementation of the 
X–tax. Repurchase of the assets after tran-
sition would provide a deduction after 
the origin–basis X–tax was implemented, 
thereby preserving the value of pre–transi-
tion basis in the assets.45 
Economic substance and sham trans-
action–type doctrines similar to those 
that exist under current law could be 
used to address simple versions of the 
transactions discussed above. However, 
international tax planners would likely 
fi nd ways to add “substance” by encasing 
tax–reduction strategies in broader trans-
actions. Destination–basis systems avoid 
this problem by making purchases from 
foreign non–taxpayers non–deductible.
WHAT ABOUT A “CREDIT–METHOD 
X–TAX”?
International trade law creates a 
catch–22 for a subtraction–method X–tax 
(Weisbach, 2003). A destination–basis sub-
traction–method X–tax violates GATT/
WTO requirements for border adjust-
ability, while an origin–basis system 
has grave administrative flaws. But a 
subtraction–method X–tax is only one of 
43 The distinction between fi nancial institutions and other institutions can also be manipulated in standard 
credit–method VATs to reduce VAT liability among related parties. (See, e.g., Halifax PLC and others v. Com-
missioners of Customs and Excise (2001 and 2002), Halifax and Others v. Customs and Excise Commissioners (2006), 
Nias and Manchia (2006)).
44 A destination–basis system would have a similar incentive with respect to pre–transition sales of assets to 
U.S. individuals, but relatively few individuals would have the wherewithal to purchase large assets and 
anti–abuse rules would be easier to police.
45 The Tax Reform Panel proposed a four–year phase–in period to move their X–tax structure from an origin 
basis to a destination basis. They recommended that importers be able to deduct 90 percent, 60 percent, and 
30 percent of the cost of their imports in years one through three of the GIT, and similarly provided that 
exporters would pay tax on 90, 60, and 30 percent of the value of export sales in years one through three 
(Tax Reform Panel, 2005, p.173–4). The Panel justifi ed this approach by arguing that if exchange rates did not 
adjust as rapidly as economic theory would suggest, border adjustments would place an undue burden on 
importers (Tax Reform Panel, 2005, p. 173–4). However, the border–adjustment phase–in allows taxpayers to 
obtain self–help transition relief by parking assets with foreign taxpayers immediately prior to adoption of 
the GIT, repurchasing that asset and receiving a deduction equivalent to 90 percent of the value of the asset 
in year one of the GIT.
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many options for making consumption 
taxes progressive. The Tax Reform Panel 
noted that its Growth and Investment Tax 
proposal is “equivalent to a credit–method 
VAT at a 30 percent rate, coupled with 
a progressive system of wage subsi-
dies and a separate single–rate tax on 
capital income” (Tax Report Panel, 2005, 
p. 171).46 
Comparing the advantages and disad-
vantages of a subtraction–method X–tax 
with a credit–method VAT paired with 
wage subsidies therefore seems appro-
priate. However, paying progressive 
wage subsidies to individuals encounters 
political resistance in the United States.47 
On the other hand, both conservatives 
and liberals have proposed supports pro-
vided at the business level to encourage 
employment.48 Given bipartisan interest 
in hiring incentives at the business level, 
political constraints on wage subsidies 
paid to individuals, and the administra-
tive advantages associated with a VAT, it 
makes sense to ask whether a progressive 
consumption tax that is economically 
similar to the X–tax could be developed 
through a system that couples a VAT with 
support payments at the business level—
what this article calls a “Credit–method 
X–tax.”
Features of a “Credit–Method X–tax”
A credit–method X–tax would combine 
three components: a credit–method VAT, 
employment support payments at the 
business level, and a wage tax. Together, 
the three components form an integrated 
system.49 The system could be designed 
to achieve the same distributional and 
revenue goals as an X–tax. 
Credit–Method VAT
Businesses would collect tax on all 
of their receipts except export sales. As 
in any credit–method VAT, businesses 
would reduce the amount of tax they were 
required to remit to the government by a 
credit for VAT paid on business expenses. 
Tax paid would be subtracted from tenta-
tive tax liability to determine the amount 
the business remits to the government.50
Business–Level Support Payments
Businesses would not pay VAT when 
purchasing labor under the credit–method 
X–tax, because labor is not supplied by 
46 The tax on capital income was the income tax component of the GIT’s income tax/consumption tax hybrid 
structure.
47 Even the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), a tax program that functions as a wage subsidy and is the nation’s 
most important mean–tested entitlement program, generates substantial political controversy (see Ventry 
(2000)). In 1993, the budget bill that included the landmark expansion of the EITC did not receive a single 
Republican vote in the Senate (U.S. Congress, 1993). See also, for example, the remarks of Rep. Price (D–NC) 
in the fl oor debate on the 1993 bill, noting that “[i]n 1993, our Republican colleagues stand united against the 
earned income tax credit” (Price, 1993).
48 Calls for making the research and development tax credit “permanent,” (part of President Bush’s competi-
tiveness agenda) are based on the claim that it will provide incentives for U.S. employers to create additional 
well–paying research and support positions in the United States (R&D Credit Coalition, 2003). For example, 
Representative Cardin (D–MD), a member of the House Ways & Means Committee, introduced legislation 
co–sponsored with Representative Johnson (R–CT) to make the R&D credit permanent arguing that “R&D is 
the engine that drives economic growth and helps create new, high–level jobs” (Cardin, 2005). Presidential 
candidate John Kerry prominently featured a Jobs Credit paid to businesses for hiring new employees in 
manufacturing and other sectors affected by outsourcing as part of his economic policy platform (Kerry and 
Edwards, 2004).
49 Hall and Rabushka (1995) have pointed out that the Flat Tax is one tax despite the fact that it has multiple 
components. The same is true of a credit–method X–tax.
50 The credit–method VAT would be collected by all businesses except for those qualifying small businesses 
choosing exemption. See notes 19–21, supra and accompanying text for further discussion of small business 
exemption under a VAT. Businesses choosing exemption would not receive the business–level support pay-
ments described herein. 
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another VAT–registered business. There 
would be no VAT input credit with respect 
to wages and compensation paid.
However, businesses would receive a 
spending–side support payment based on 
the amount of wages and compensation 
paid to workers resident in the United 
States.51 The support payment would 
equal the business tax rate times the 
total wages a business paid to qualifying 
workers. This “American Jobs Credit” 
(AJC) would be administered separately 
from the VAT. It would be available to 
all registered businesses in all industries, 
regardless of whether the business was 
a domestic or foreign entity.52 All U.S. 
citizens and residents would be treated 
as qualifying workers.
Wage Tax
A tax on labor compensation at the indi-
vidual level would complete the credit–
method X–tax system. That tax would be 
collected from workers using the wage 
withholding system as under current law. 
As a result, as in a subtraction–method 
X–tax, the portion of value–added rep-
resented by wages would be taxed at the 
individual level. 
Equivalence
Example 5 (Table 5) illustrates that 
the credit–method X–tax raises the same 
amount of revenue as a subtraction–
method X–tax, from the same parties, in 
the simple case in which products are not 
exported and companies have positive 
cash fl ow.53 
The credit–method X–tax imposes 
a standard VAT. Thus (given the 30% 
tax rate), businesses face a total $30 tax 
liability on the sale of a $100 of product 
to fi nal consumers (line 14, last column). 
In addition, employees pay a wage tax 
assessed at the same rate as under a 
subtraction–method X–tax. As with the 
subtraction–method X–tax, workers pay 
$12.30 of tax on wages associated with 
$100 of sales (line 15a, last column + line 
15b, last column). In total, the government 
assesses tax liability of $42.30 (line 16, last 
column). 
Businesses then receive a support pay-
ment for employing workers subject to 
the wage tax. Businesses may net these 
support payments against tax liability. 
As a result of these support payments, 
which are shown in line 17, net revenues 
received by the government under the 
credit–method X–tax total $22.50, just as 
they do under the subtraction–method 
X–tax. Furthermore, each business (and 
each group of wage earners) makes the 
same net payment to the government as 
they would under the subtraction–method 
X–tax.
WTO COMPLIANCE AND THE 
CREDIT–METHOD X–TAX
The deduction for wages in the sub-
traction–method X–tax and the business 
support payments in the credit–method 
X–tax have the same effect—they 
both result in a consumption tax that 
taxes the value added by labor progres-
sively. The purely formal structural 
differences between the two taxes do, 
however, produce a different result 
under the legalistic test applied by the 
GATT to determine border adjustabil-
51 Qualifying persons could be either U.S. or foreign nationals. The requirement would be that they pay tax to 
the United States on their earned income. 
52 Business registration requirements would be roughly similar to registration requirements under a credit–method 
VAT.
53 No assertion is intended as to whether the economic incidence of the subtraction–method X–tax and the 
credit–method X–tax would be perfectly identical. That question may warrant further study.
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ity. The credit–method X–tax should be 
WTO–compliant.54 
Credit–Method VAT
WTO agreements specifi cally list the 
value–added tax as an “indirect” and, 
therefore, border–adjustable tax (ASCM, 
1994, Annex I(g)).55 The credit–method 
VAT component of the credit–method 
X–tax would, therefore, be border adjust-
able. 
Acceptability of Business–Level Support 
Payments
The business–level support payments 
included in the credit–method X–tax also 
would not raise WTO compliance ques-
tions. WTO rules permit programs outside 
of a country’s tax system that encourage 
businesses to hire workers.
The ASCM permits subsidies that are 
not contingent on export performance or 
on using domestic rather than imported 
inputs, and that are not “specifi c” (ASCM, 
1994, art. 8). If legislation “explicitly limits 
access to a subsidy to certain enterprises,” 
a subsidy will be deemed “specific” 
(ASCM, 1994, art. 2.1(a)). If a government 
establishes “objective criteria or condi-
tions” that govern both eligibility for and 
the amount of a subsidy, the subsidy is 
deemed to be non–specifi c (ASCM, 1994, 
art. 2.1(b)). WTO agreements provide that 
criteria or conditions are objective when 
they are spelled out in law, capable of veri-
fi cation, “neutral,” do not favor certain 
enterprises over others,56 are economic 
in nature and “horizontal” in application 
(e.g., number of employees or size of 
enterprise) (ASCM, 1994, art. 2.1(b)).
Applying these criteria, the AJC would 
be permissible. The AJC is not contingent 
on export performance or the use of 
domestic over imported goods. Eligibil-
ity for the credit would be automatic 
and available to all U.S.–owned and 
foreign–owned businesses on exactly the 
same basis regardless of the type of busi-
ness or industry. Employment support 
payments would not be limited to certain 
enterprises, and would be available to 
businesses regardless of whether workers 
are U.S. or foreign persons, so long as the 
worker pays U.S. individual–level tax. 
Those criteria do not favor some enter-
prises over others. Thus, the AJC meets 
the requirements for a permissible subsidy 
under the ACSM. 
WTO agreements in fact explicitly sanc-
tion programs like the AJC. In the Tokyo 
Round of Agreements with respect to the 
GATT, signatories agreed that subsidies 
(other than export subsidies) intended 
“generally to sustain employment” 
were permitted as they were “important 
54 Morrison (2006) suggested that an arrangement briefl y described by Goldberg (2000) might also solve the 
WTO/GATT conundrum inherent in a traditional subtraction–method X–tax. That arrangement would treat all 
workers as if they were a business for VAT purposes. Wages would then be subject to VAT. For administrative 
purposes employers would withhold tax on wages at a single rate, and employees would credit that withholding 
against their progressive consumption liability. If the amount of VAT due on their wages was less than what had 
been withheld, an employee would claim a refund on a VAT return. Effectively, wage subsidy payments at the 
individual level would be styled as VAT refunds (Goldberg, 2000). The Goldberg/Morrison alternative, while 
intriguing, is susceptible to a few criticisms that do not apply to the credit–method X–tax. First, if workers were 
treated as VAT–paying businesses, it is not clear how a progressive rate schedule would apply to cash fl ow from 
wages but not taxable cash fl ow from sales. Second, VAT payroll withholding might be viewed as a “direct” 
wage tax that cannot be border adjusted under the WTO, rather than a VAT that can be border adjusted. Third, 
in such a system, all personal services provided abroad by U.S. persons would be border–adjustable exports.
55 The 1970 GATT Working Party Report on Border Tax Adjustments also concluded that indirect taxes were 
limited to taxes “directly levied on products.” (GATT, 1970, para. 14). 
56 Additionally, use or predominant use of a subsidy program by a limited number of enterprises, or by enter-
prises limited to a designated geographical region, and the manner in which any discretion is exercised by 
the granting authority may also make a subsidy specifi c (ASCM, 1994, art. 2.1(c)). 
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instruments for the promotion of social 
and economic policy objectives” (GATT, 
1973). Jobs subsidies programs currently 
in use or previously used by other OECD 
countries that are somewhat narrower but 
otherwise similar to the AJC have never 
been challenged at the WTO.57
“Substance over Form” Arguments
Some observers argue that a uniformly 
available employment support payment 
would lead the WTO to “look through” 
the form and conclude that as a matter 
of substance the AJC mimics the effect 
of the deduction for wages in a subtrac-
TABLE 5
EXAMPLE 5: SUBTRACTION–METHOD VAT, CREDIT–METHOD VAT, SUBTRACTION–METHOD X–TAX, 
AND CREDIT–METHOD X–TAX
Economic Activity
Basic transactions
1. Sales
2. Purchases
3a. Lower–bracket labor
3b. Higher–bracket labor
4. Value added (sales – purchases)
Subtraction–Method VAT
5. VAT liability
     (30% of line 4)
Credit–Method VAT
6. Tax on sales (30% of line 1)
7. Less:  input tax on purchases
8. Net VAT liability
Subtraction–Method X–tax
9. Tax paid at business level
     (0.3 × (line 4 – line 3a – line 3b))
10. Tax paid at individual level—
      lower bracket (15% of line 3a)
11. Tax paid at individual level—
      higher bracket (30% of line 3b)
12. Total Subtraction–Method X–tax 
       Collections
Credit–Method X–tax
12. VAT assessed on sales 
      (30% of line 1)
13. Less: input tax on purchases
14. VAT liability 
15a. Wage tax (X–tax paid at 
        individual level) lower bracket 
       (15% of line 3a)
15b. Wage tax (X–tax paid at 
        individual level) higher 
        bracket (30% of line 3b)
16. Total VAT + wage tax 
       (credit–method X–tax) 
       collection
17. Less: “American Jobs Credit” 
     (30% of lines 3a + 3b)
18. Total “credit–method X–tax” 
       liability
Farmer
$ 30
 $ 0
$ 20
 $ 0
$ 30
 $ 9
 $ 9
 $ 0
 $ 9
 $ 3
 $ 3
 $ 0
 $ 6
 $ 9
 $ 0
 $ 9
 $ 3
 $ 0
$ 12
 $ 6
 $ 6
Brewer
$ 70
$ 30
$ 10
$ 10
$ 40
$ 12
$ 21
 $ 9
$ 12
 $ 6
        $ 1.50
 $ 3
       $ 10.50
$ 21
 $ 9
$ 12
       $ 1.50
 $3
      $ 16.50
 $ 6
       $ 10.50
Retailer
$ 100
 $ 70
 $ 20
  $ 6
 $ 30 
  $ 9
 $ 30
 $ 21
  $ 9
     $ 1.20
  $ 3
        $ 1.80
  $ 6
 $ 30
 $ 21
  $ 9
  $ 3
       $1.80
      $ 13.80
       $ 7.80
  $ 6
Total
 
 
 
$ 100
 $ 30
 
 
 $ 30
      $ 10.20
     $ 7.50
        $ 4.80
       $ 22.50
 
 
 $ 30
        $ 7.50 
      $ 4.80
       $ 42.30
       $ 22.50
57 Germany, for example, has a series of “active labor” programs that typically take the form of direct subsidies to 
employers; amounts provided are calculated as a percentage of total salary costs (Human Resource and Skills 
Development Canada, 1994). Other countries similarly use wage subsidies that are available on a non–discrimi-
natory basis but target workers in a specifi c sector. None of these programs has been challenged at the WTO.
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tion–method X–tax and, therefore, is 
not compliant with the GATT/WTO 
(Merrill, 2006). However, because the 
direct/indirect distinction lacks economic 
substance, it can only be applied in a 
formalistic manner.58 Were the AJC cash 
subsidy to convert a credit–method VAT 
from an indirect tax to a direct tax that 
is not border–adjustable, then European 
wage subsidy programs that similarly 
provide support to businesses would also 
be suspect.
One can also imagine credit–method 
X–tax border adjustments being challenged 
on the grounds that in substance they pro-
vide an “exemption or remission” of tax in 
excess of the tax imposed on like products 
when sold for domestic consumption. 
Economic Activity
Basic transactions
1. Sales
2. Purchases
3a. Lower–bracket labor
3b. Higher–bracket labor
4. Value added (sales – purchases)
Subtraction–Method VAT
5. Subtraction–method VAT
     (30% of line 4)
Credit–Method VAT
6. Tax on sales (30% of line 1)
7. Less: input tax on purchases
8. Net VAT liability
Subtraction–Method X–tax
9. Tax paid at business level 
      (30% of line 4 – line 3a – line 3b)
10. Tax paid at individual level—
       lower bracket (15% of line 3a)
11. Tax paid at individual level—
       higher bracket (30% of line 3b)
12. Total subtraction–method X–tax
Credit–Method X–tax
12. VAT assessed on sales (30% of line 1)
13. Less: input tax on purchases
14. VAT liability 
15a. Wage tax (X–tax paid at individual level) 
        lower bracket (15% of line 3a)
15b. Wage tax (X–tax paid at individual level)
     higher bracket (30% of line 3b)
16. Total VAT + wage tax 
       (credit–method X–tax) collection
17. Less: “American Jobs Credit” 
       (30% of lines 3a + 3b)
18. Total “credit–method X–tax” liability
Farmer
$ 30
 $ 0
$ 20
 $ 0
$ 30 
 $ 9
 $ 9
 $ 0
 $ 9
 $ 3
 $ 3
 $ 0
 $ 6
 $ 9
 $ 0
 $ 9
 $ 3
 $ 0
$ 12
 $ 6
 $ 6
Brewer
$ 70
$ 30
$ 10
$ 10
$ 40
$ 12
$ 21
 $ 9
$ 12
 $ 6
       $ 1.50
 $ 3
     $ 10.50
$ 21
 $ 9
$ 12
       $ 1.50
 $ 3
      $ 16.50
 $ 6
     $ 10.50
Beer Exporter
$ 100 (zero–rated)
 $ 70
 $ 20
  $ 6
–$ 70 
 –$ 21*
$ 0 (zero–rated)
  $ 21*
–$ 21
        –$ 28.80 *?
  $ 3
        $ 1.80
–$ 24
$ 0 (zero–rated)
  $ 21*
–$ 21
  $ 3
       $ 1.80
     –$ 16.20
       $ 7.80
–$ 24
Total
 
 
 
$ 100
  $ 0
 
 
  $ 0
      –$ 19.80
        $ 7.50 
        $ 4.80
       –$ 7.50
 
 
  $ 0
        $ 7.50 
     $4.80
    $ 12.30
      – $ 7.50
*Border adjustment.
TABLE 6
EXAMPLE 6: SUBTRACTION–METHOD VAT, CREDIT–METHOD VAT, SUBTRACTION–METHOD X–TAX, 
AND CREDIT–METHOD X–TAX WITH EXPORTS
58 Economists have long disputed the incidence of the corporate tax, and in a global economy there are also 
disputes about the incidence of VAT. Perhaps the application of WTO distinctions between direct and indirect 
taxes would be less formalistic if economists could provide greater certainty regarding economic incidence 
questions. One recent analysis of the incidence of the corporate tax suggests that it may largely be borne by 
labor (Randolph, 2006); another important contribution highlights ways in which the ultimate incidence of 
the tax remains unresolved.
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The $28.80 in total payments the exporter 
receives from the government under a 
credit–method X–tax (line 14 + line 17) is 
the same amount that would be received 
through a subtraction–method X–tax bor-
der adjustment (line 9). As such, it could be 
claimed that the credit–method X–tax pro-
vides excess remission of tax and should 
receive the same treatment under WTO 
rules as a subtraction–method X–tax. 
However, the same arguments that sug-
gest the AJC is permissible under WTO 
rules suggest the AJC cannot be taken into 
account in determining whether there is 
excess remission of a tax. Labor subsidies 
are not treated as part of the tax system 
for WTO purposes.59 Again, the parallel 
to European wage subsidy programs 
applies. Those programs, when combined 
with a border adjustment, produce an 
overall tax plus wage subsidy net rebate 
on exported products.
OTHER ALTERNATIVES 
The Tax Reform Panel indicated that 
they chose the subtraction–method X–tax 
in order to gain the benefi ts of a consump-
tion tax while maintaining the progressiv-
ity of the status quo. As discussed above, 
this result can also be achieved using 
a credit–method X–tax that allows for 
superior administration and enforcement. 
However, the credit–method X–tax is only 
one of many WTO–compliant alternatives 
if the goal is to improve the progressivity 
of a consumption tax. Cash payments 
to individuals, “e–cards,” a payroll tax 
rebate (such as that proposed by Graetz), 
VAT tax credits,60 or other demigrants 
can all improve the progressivity of a 
credit–method VAT (Graetz, 2002). These 
alternatives could each produce distri-
butional results that are similar to any 
X–tax variant, and each may be politically 
appealing to policymakers. 
An important difference between the 
consumption tax systems described in 
this article and VATs used in the rest of 
the developed world is that the latter sit 
alongside income taxes, whereas the tax 
systems considered here would replace the 
income tax.61 Although beyond the scope of 
this article, the existence of an income tax 
alongside a consumption tax may reduce 
certain incentives for evasion or avoidance 
of a consumption tax.  For instance, the 
higher rate required to fully replace the 
income tax might encourage greater tax 
evasion.  The existence of a national income 
tax alongside a national VAT may also have 
other salutary effects for tax administration 
and enforcement.  For example, data col-
lected for purposes of enforcing the VAT 
may help with income tax enforcement, 
and vice versa.  These issues are important 
areas for further study if an X–tax were to 
receive serious consideration by policy-
makers. A credit–method VAT alongside 
a reduced income tax may be better than 
any “one tax” system. 
CONCLUSION
The credit–method X–tax and the sub-
traction–method X–tax are two similar 
ways of taxing consumption. Both taxes can 
be made progressive, and with proper cali-
bration the level of progressivity implied 
by one tax regime can be recreated in the 
59 GATT historically resisted explicitly addressing labor policies. For example, the U.S. request to link fl exible labor 
rules and free trade in a ministers’ declaration made at the time of formation of the WTO was rebuffed (Riding, 
1994). Further, when linkages were explored, the question was whether labor standards and wage supports were 
suffi ciently high, and not whether a country was providing excessive wage supports (Alben, 2001).
60 Canada uses such a credit to make its Goods and Services Tax (a credit–method VAT) more progressive (Mitchell 
and Shillington, 2004).
61 Special enforcement problems would arise were a residual tax on capital income only retained alongside an 
X–tax. The Tax Reform Panel’s Growth and Investment Tax recommendation included such a tax at a rate of 
15 percent on interest, dividends, and capital gains. 
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other. However, it could be politically dif-
fi cult to adapt credit–method best practices 
such as those associated with information 
collection, small businesses, and losses to 
a subtraction–method system. Further, the 
mechanisms used to make the subtraction–
method X–tax progressive are problematic 
under WTO rules. A subtraction–method 
X–tax cannot be administered on a desti-
nation basis and remain WTO–compliant. 
A destination–basis consumption tax is 
strongly preferable to an origin–basis 
consumption tax from an administration 
and enforcement perspective. In contrast, 
a progressive consumption tax system 
based on a credit–method VAT, such as the 
credit–method X–tax, can simultaneously 
be imposed on a destination basis and 
comply with current WTO rules. 
Thus, even if policymakers’ desired 
distributional outcomes matched the dis-
tribution of the tax burden produced by a 
variant of the subtraction–method X–tax, it 
would be preferable to achieve that result 
using a system based on a credit–method 
VAT. Depending on the distributional 
results policymakers wished to achieve, 
one appropriate mechanism for provid-
ing progressivity to the VAT could be the 
credit–method X–tax outlined here, utiliz-
ing an appropriate business–level wage 
subsidy and a tax on wages. 
The academic literature has given insuf-
fi cient attention to political and adminis-
trative realities in weighing the costs and 
benefi ts of a subtraction–method X–tax 
as compared to a credit–method–based 
system. This article describes some of the 
issues and offers one proposal to maintain 
progressivity, avoid the WTO compliance 
and tax enforcement paradox, and retain 
the practical advantages of the credit–
method system. Continued work in this 
area would be of benefi t to the literature. 
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